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WYOMING PROCEDURE RE ADMISSIBILITY OF
CONFESSIONSt
John 0. Rames*

This presentation will deal primarily with the problem of procedure in
Wyoming District Courts when an alleged confession of the accused is offered
in evidence by the prosecution and objection is made by the accused on the
ground, inter alia, that the confession is coerced and therefore inadmissible.
For the purpose of this discussion, all confessions which are determined to be
other than voluntary will be classified as "coerced"-for example, one induced
by promise of leniency.
Professor Remington has dealt very skillfully with the effect of lack of
assistance of counsel upon the admissibility of confessions, where assistance of
counsel is constitutionally required, and I do not propose to touch upon that
matter. Nor do I propose to trespass upon Mr. Hand's excellent treatment of
the subject of unreasonable search and seizure and its effect upon the admissibility of evidence obtained thereby, although this, too, bears significantly upon
the admissibility of confessions. My presentation is limited to the problem of
voluntary versus coerced confessions, and the functions of the trial judge and
the jury in connection therewith.
First of all, what is a confession? McKelvey' defines it simply as "admissions of guilt made by persons accused of crime." He makes it clear that such
admissions must be express, or direct, rather than implied or circumstantial.
As indicated by the definition, confessions are classified under the heading
of admissions so far as the hearsay rule is concerned, and come in under the
admissions exception to that rule. Because of their special character, however,
courts, and to some extent legislatures, have seen fit to surround confessions
with conditions and limitations above and beyond ordinary admissions, with
the object of affording protection to an accused additional to the protection
implicit in the terms of the admissions exception. These special conditions
and limitations give rise to procedural problems when a confession is offered
inevidence.
Circumstantial evidence of guilt of a crime and so-called "implied admissions" from acts and conduct are not classified as confessions, and their
2
admissibility is not subject to the special rules pertaining to confessions.
Furthermore, extra-judicial statements of an accused which tend to connect
him with a crime but which do not go so far as to constitute admissions of
f
*
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A paper delivered at the Institute on Current Problems of Criminal Justice held at
the University of Wyoming College of Law on May 14-15, 1965.
Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
McKELVEY, EVIDENcE 221 (5th ed. 1944).
Id. at 223.
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guilt are not confessions, and are to be treated as ordinary admissions. But
if the admission is so serious as to be almost as persuasive of guilt as a full
and complete confession would be, some courts apply the confession standards.3
4
Wyoming is in this category.
In the case of Mortimore v. State,;- the defendant was charged with the first
degree murder of his father. At the county jail, prior to the trial, the defendant
admitted that he fired the shot which killed the father, but stated that he did
so in order to protect a brother from imminent danger of death at the hands
of the father. The prosecution offered in evidence, as a mere admission,
defendant's statement that he had killed his father. The trial court admitted
the statement over defendant's objection.
The Wyoming Supreme Court
said this:
[W]hile a confession is generally restricted to statements acknowledging
guilt, and more exculpatory statements denying guilt are not
confessions, a statemcnt admitting an act essential to the crime charged
and importing guilt, should not be treated as a mere admission
receivable in evidence without a showing of its voluntary character . . . . To render the evidence of the statements admissible, it
was necessary to show that they were freely and voluntarily made
under the rules relating to confessions.'
The Supreme Court reached the conclusion that there was an adequate showing
of the voluntary character of the statement, but reversed the conviction on
other grounds.
It is obviously a question of degree, to be determined under the facts
of each case, as to just how close to a confession a statement must be in
order to qualify for "confession treatment" under the Mortimore case.
Starting from the basic rule that if the confession is voluntary it is
admissible, whereas if it is coerced it is inadmissible, let us consider what
happens, procedurally speaking, when the prosecution offers in evidence a
statement of the accused which qualifies under the definition of confession
as we have outlined it above. McCormick puts it this way:
Under the usual practice, when the state offers a confession, a
complete acknowledgment of guilt, the defendant may object on the
ground that it has not been shown to have been voluntary, and if
he does, the state has the duty of producing proof of voluntariness
in a preliminary hearing on which the accused may offer counterevidence. This is a time-consuming procedure, but one which is
appropriate in determining the admissibility of a confession,
as to
7
which the liklihood of undue pressure is substantial.
In Wyoming, the leading and probably the only case in which our procedure is described in some detail is Clay v. State.s The case has not since been cited or discussed by the Wyoming Supreme Court on this point, nor has research
3.

MCCORMICK,

EVIDENCE

234 (1954).

4. Mortimer v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 161 Pac. 766 (1916) followed in State v. Mau, 41 Wyo.
365, 285 Pac. 992, 997 (1930); accord, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
5. 24 Wyo. 452, 161 Pac. 766 (1916).
6. Id. at 768.
7. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 235.
8. 15 Wyo. 42, 86 Pac. 17 (1906), reh. denied 15 Wyo. 73, 86 Pac. 544 (1906).
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disclosed any other Wyoming authority dealing with the problem. In addition,
what was said in the Clay opinion was dictum.
In the Clay case the defendant was convicted of first degree murder of
one George Gerber, who was a storekeeper on Front Street in Laramie, and
who was known to keep money in a cigar box in the store. Following the
discovery of the dead body of Gerber, one Dicey was arrested and jailed in
Laramie on suspicion of murder, and defendant Clay was arrested and jailed
in Cheyenne on suspicion of the same murder, because Dicey had made a
statement implicating Clay. Using a ruse, the Cheyenne sheriff induced
Clay to come with him to the jail in Laramie, and there suddenly confronted
him with Dicey, defendant not having known that Dicey was in custody.
Defendant thereupon blurted out a confession of the murder, and this was
overheard by the Laramie and Cheyenne sheriffs. At the subsequent trial
of Clay, the sheriffs apparently testified to his confession. The Supreme
Court held that under these circumstances the confession was voluntary, and
went on to comment on the procedure employed at the trial when the confession
was offered in evidence. The opinion is not clear as to the details of the
preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. In particular,
it is not stated whether the preliminary hearing was conducted in the presence
of the jury or outside the presence of the jury. The following portion of the
opinion pertains to our problem:
The object and purpose of a preliminary examination of this kind is
to determine whether the incriminating statemen~ts ought in any event
to go to the jury; and if it clearly appears that they were made under
a promise of immunity from punishment, duress, or by putting in
fear, then they should be excluded. If, however, it appears that such
statements were voluntary, or the evidence is conflicting as to whether
they were in fact voluntary, then, in either event, such statements
should go to the jury, together with evidence of the facts and surrounding conditions at the time they were made, with instructions
to determine their character, and if, from the evidence, the jury find
that they were not voluntary, then to exclude them from their consideration; otherwise, to consider them with the other evidence in
the case, and give them such weight as in their judgment they are
entitled to. There was no error in permitting these statements to go
to the jury .... 9
'he court reversed the conviction because it found that two of the instructions
dealing with presumptions were erroneous and materially prejudicial to the
accused. It will be noted that in the excerpt quoted from the opinion there
was no mention of a requirement that the trial judge make a formal finding
expressing his own conclusion as to the voluntariness of the confession.
Thus, two unanswered queries relative to the preliminary hearing emerge
from the opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Clay v. State: (1) Should
the hearing be held outside of the presence of the jury? (2) Must the trial
judge make a formal finding as to the voluntariness of the confession, and
communicate this finding to the jury?
9. Id. at 19.
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The significance of these queries is evident when one contemplates the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Jackson v.
Denno.10 Jackson held up a hotel clerk in Brooklyn about 1 o'clock in the
morning of June 14, 1960. After leaving the hotel he engaged in a gun
battle with a policeman. The policeman died from one of the bullet wounds.
Two of the policeman's shots hit Jackson, one in the liver and the other in
the lung. Jackson hailed a cab which took him to the hospital. The shooting
occurred after 1 A. M., and about 2 A. M., soon after his arrival at the
hospital, a detective questioned Jackson. When the detective asked him his
name, he replied, "Nathan Jackson. I shot the colored cop. I got the drop
At the same time he admitted the robbery at the hotel. The
on him."
detective later testified that at this time Jackson was in strong condition, despite
his wounds. At 3:55 A. M. he was given demerol and scopolamine (truth
Immediately thereafter, an assistant district attorney questioned
serum).
Jackson in the presence of police officers and hospital personnel, and a
stenographer recorded the questions and answers. By this time he had lost
a good deal of blood. He again admitted the robbery, then said, "Look, I
can't go on," but in response to further questions he admitted shooting the
policeman and having fired the first shot.
At his later trial for first degree murder in a New York state court, the
prosecution offered in evidence as confessions the statements made by Jackson
at both 2 A. M. and at 3:55 A. M. Although defense counsel did not
formally object to their admission, the United States Supreme Court, for
various reasons, treated the situation as if a formal objection had been made
on the grounds that the confessions were not voluntary. Jackson took the stand
and gave an account of the robbery and the shooting that differed in important
He testified that when questioned in the
respects from his confessions.
hospital he was in pain and gasping for breath, and that he was refused water
and was told that the police would not let him alone until he gave them the
answers they wanted, all of which the officers denied. He testified that he
remembered the interrogation, but said he could remember neither the quesThe defense attorney also argued that Jackson's
tions nor the answers.
responses at 3:55 A. M. were affected by the demerol and scopolamine, which
the prosecution denied. Obviously, the facts presented an issue as to the
voluntary character of the confessions.
The trial court submitted the issue of the voluntariness of the confession,
or confessions, to the jury, along with the other issues in the case. The jury
was instructed that if it found the confession involuntary, it was to disregard
it entirely, and determine guilt or innocence solely from the other evidence
in the case; alternatively, if it found the confession voluntary, it was to
determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly. This was
a typical application of what is called the "New York rule," or procedure,
when an issue is raised as to the voluntariness of a. confession offered in
evidence by the prosecution.
10. 378 U. S. 368 (1964).
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The New York state court jury found Jackson guilty of first degree
murder, and he was sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals," with that court certifying that it had necessarily
passed upon the voluntariness of the confessions, and had found that Jackson's
constitutional rights had not been violated. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari.12 Jackson then filed a habeas corpus in the federal district
court, claiming that the New York court procedure for determining the
voluntariness of a confession was unconstitutional, and that in any event his
confession was coerced. The federal district court examined the state court
record and heard argument, but did not hold an evidentiary hearing, found
that the confessions were voluntary, and that the New York procedure
was constitutional.13 The federal court of appeals affirmed.14 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of
the New York procedure governing the admissibility of a confession alleged
to be involuntary, and reversed, with Justices Clark, Harlan and Stewart
dissenting, and with Justice Black dissenting in part. The majority held that
the New York procedure violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. 15
Exactly what was the New York procedure, or as it is usually called,
"the New York rule?" We should observe, at the outset, that the New York
rule is only one of several rules, each somewhat different from the others,
whereby the admissibility of confessions is determined. Professor Bernard
Meltzer, of the University of Chicago Law School, some years ago wrote an
article'" in which he identified and described four different views, or rules,
followed in the various jurisdictions. The Court in the Jackson opinion seemed
to place great reliance on the Meltzer article. According to the New York
rule, as explained by the Court and Meltzer, when a confession is offered and
objected to as being coerced, the judge holds a preliminary hearing on the
voluntariness of the confession. He is not required to exclude the jury, "and
perhaps is not allowed to do so."'1 7 At this hearing, testimony and other
evidence bearing on voluntariness is taken. When it is over, if the judge
deems the confession coerced as a matter of law, he excludes it, and presumably
he instructs the jury to disregard it in arriving at a verdict.
But if the evidence presents a fair question as to its voluntariness, as
where certain facts bearing on the issue are in dispute or where
reasonable men could differ over the inferences to be drawn from
undisputed facts, the judge 'must receive the confession and leave to
the jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determination of its
voluntary character 'and also its truthfulness.' ( Footnote omitted).
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172. If an issue of coercion is pre11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

219 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1961).
368 U.S. 949 (1961).
206 F.Supp. 759(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962).
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge

17.

and Jury, 21 U. CI. L. REv. 317 (1954).
Jackson, supra note 10, at 377 n.7.
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sented, the judge may not resolve conflicting evidence or arrive at his
independent appraisal of the voluntariness of the confession, one way
i
or the other. These matters he must leave to the jury.
The Court emphasized, in Jackson v. Denno, that the New York jury
returns only a general verdict upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,
and that it is therefore impossible to ascertain whether the jury found the
confession voluntary and relied upon it, or found it involuntary and supposedly
ignored it. Furthermore, it is impossible to discover how the New York jury
resolved disputes in the evidence concerning the critical facts underlying the
coercion issue.
When we compare Wyoming procedure as outlined in the Clay case with
New York procedure as outlined in the Jackson case we are at once struck
with the similarity of the two. As pointed out supra, what the Wyoming
Supreme Court said in Clay leaves two unanswered questions of much importance in the light of Jackson: first, is the preliminary hearing to be held outside
the presence of the Wyoming jury, and second, does the Wyoming trial judge
make a formal finding as to the voluntariness of a confession which he allows
to go to the jury, communicating this finding to the jury? It is interesting
to note that Mr. Justice Black, who dissented in part and concurred in part,
classified Wyoming as following the New York rule, on the basis of the Clay
case. 19 The majority, consisting of Justices White (who wrote the opinion),
Brennan, Douglas, Goldberg, and Chief Justice Warren, on the basis of Clay v.
State classified Wyoming as being among "Those jurisdictions where it appears
unclear from appellate court opinions whether the Massachusetts or New York

procedure is used in the trial court. ....

",20

In addition to the New York rule there are two other main rules or
procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession-the "orthodox
rule" and the "Massachusetts rule. ' ' 21 As briefly explained by Mr. Justice
White, 22 under the former the judge himself solely and finally determines the
voluntariness of the confession. Under the Massachusetts rule,
the judge hears the confession evidence, himself resolves evidentiary
conflicts and gives his own answer to the coercion issue, rejecting
confessions he deems involuntary and admitting only those he believes
voluntary. It is only the latter confessions that are heard by the
disagree with the judge,
jury, which may then, under this procedure, 23
find the confession involuntary and ignore it.
It seems evident that under the Massachusetts rule the preliminary hearing
is conducted outside the presence of the jury.
In Jackson v. Denno the Court held that the New York rule violated the
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 417.

Id. at 379 n. 8.
Professor Meltzer identified four rules rather than three, but his fourth rule is one
in which the trial court is given discretion to follow the orthodox rule or the Massachusetts rule; see Meltzer, supra note 16, at 320. He pointed out a number of other
variations which have existed in both state and federal courts.
22. Jackson, supra note 10, at 378.
23. Ibid.
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It approved the Massachusetts rule by way of dictum in a footnote 24 and expressed no opinion concerning
the constitutionality of the orthodox rule. Since Wyoming may follow the
New York rule, a summary of the infirmities of the New York rule as enumerated in the majority opinion is in order:
(1) It provides no definite and separate decision of the coercion issue.
After a verdict of guilty, the accused cannot know whether the jury found the
confession voluntary, and took it into consideration in reaching the guilty
verdict, or whether the jury found it coerced, presumably ignored it, and
found sufficient evidence outside the confession to justify a guilty verdict.
Thus, on appeal or in subsequent proceedings, the accused does not and
cannot know what he is attacking.
(2) Possibly the confession serves as a make-weight in a compromise
verdict-some jurors accepting the confession, others rejecting it but finding
sufficient other evidence, and some jurors never reaching a separate conclusion as to the confession, but returning an unanalytical verdict based on
all they heard.
(3) The jury gets all the evidence at once, including evidence which
tends to prove the truth of the confession. The jury is inevitably influenced
by evidence tending to establish the truth of the confession. Of course, the
mere fact that a coerced confession is true does not qualify it for admission
into evidence. Thus, evidence of the truth of the confession inevitably distorts
the judgment of the jury on resolving conflicting evidence as to coercion.
In this regard the Court quoted Professor Morgan's statement that "regardless
of the pious fiction indulged by the courts, it is useless to contend that a
juror who has heard the confession can be uninfluenced by his opinion as to
the truth or falsity of it."' 25 The Court in the Jackson opinion regarded this
third fault as being the most serious of all.
The United States Supreme Court had previously upheld the constitutionality of the New York Rule in Stein v. New York, 26 and much of the opinion
in the Jackson case was devoted to a critical analysis of the Stein rationale.
Stein was expressly overruled by Jackson.2 7 The Court reversed the Jackson
case and remanded it to the federal district court to allow New York a reasonable time to afford the accused either a proper hearing on the issue of coercion,
or a new trial, with the observation that:
Of course, if the state court, at an evidentiary hearing, redetermines
the facts and decides that Jackson's confession was involuntary, there
or innocence without the confession
must be a new trial on guilt
28
being admitted in evidence.
The State apparently decided to give Jackson a new trial. Under date of
April 4, 1965, the Associated Press reported that Jackson at a new trial
24. Id. at 378 n. 8.
25. Id. at 382 n. 10.

26. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
27. Jackson, supra note 10, at 391.

28. Id. at 394.
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had again been convicted of first degree murder; but the dispatch did not
state whether or not the confessions were admitted in evidence at the second
trial.
Il Wyoming trial judges have been following the New York rule, it is
obvious that this procedure can continue no longer. There appear to be
three possible alternatives: the orthodox rule, the Massachusetts rule, or a
procedure under which the trial judge has discretion to follow either the
orthodox rule or the Massachusetts rule. 29 As to the first, although the Court
in Jackson v. Denno did not pass upon its consfitutionality, it should be
satisfactory to the Court inasmuch as it meets all the objections to the New
York rule voiced in Jackson v. Denno. If the orthodox rule should be adopted,
then, in the event the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntary,
the evidence surrounding the making of a confession ought to be presented
to the jury; not on the issue of the voluntariness of the confession but on the
issue of its credibility and weight. No matter which rule is applied,
two requirements must be observed: (1) The preliminary hearing must take
place outside the presence of the jury, and (2) The trial judge must make
an express finding on the issue of voluntariness before this issue can be
submitted to the jury. In approving the Massachusetts procedure the Court
made the following observations:
Given the integrity of the preliminary proceedings before the judge,
the Massachusetts procedure does not, in our opinion, pose hazards
to the rights of a defendant. While no more will be known about
the views of the jury than under the New York rule, the jury does
not hear all confessions where there is a fair question of voluntariness,
but only those which a judge actually and independently determines
to be voluntary, based upon all of the evidence. The judge's consideration of voluntariness is carried out separate and aside from issues
of the reliability of the confession and the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and without regard to the fact (that) the issue may again
be raised before the jury if decided against the defendant. The record
will show the judge's conclusions in this regard and his findings upon
the underlying facts may be express or ascertainable from the record.
Once the confession is properly found to be voluntary by the judge,
reconsideration of this issue by the jury does not, of course, improperly affect the jury's determination of the credibility or probativeness
of the confession, or its ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.:
Under the Massachusetts rule, if the judge finds the confession voluntary
the confession testimony would then be repeated before the jury. The jury
may thereafter disagree with the judge and find the confession coerced. This
rule appears, then, to be a sort of compromise between the orthodox and the
New York rule.
The United States Supreme Court's approval of the Massachusetts rule
seems to me surprising in view of the criticisms which the Court voiced about
the New York rule. As the Court itself admits, it cannot be determined under
the Massachusetts rule, any more than it can be determined under the New York
29. As to the latter possibility see supra note 21.
30. Jackson, supra note 24.
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rule, whether the jury agreed with the judge the confession was voluntary, and
took it into account in arriving at a verdict, or whether the jury found it to
be coerced, and presumably ignored it, but believed that there was sufficient
evidence outside the confession to justify a verdict of guilty.
When he
attacks the verdict, the accused does not know what he is -attacking under
the Massachusetts rule any more than he knows what he is attacking under
the New York rule. It seems to me also that the other two criticisms of the
New York apply with equal force to the Massachusetts rule; that confession
may serve as a make-weight in a compromise verdict, and that since the
jury gets all the evidence at once, it will inevitably be influenced by evidence
tending to establish the truth of the confession.
For Wyoming the easy way out (assuming no state constitutional obstacle)
would be to go over to the orthodox rule; let the judge himself solely and
finally determine the voluntariness of the confession. Wigmore favors this
procedure, 1 and states that it "is well recognized in the majority of jurisdictions. '3 2 He cites, in support, cases from England, the 2nd and 7th federal
circuits, and from 28 states. He adds, however, that " . . . in comparatively
recent times the heresy of leaving the question to the jury has made rapid
strides,'1 .13 and cites an almost equal number of jurisdictions, including many
federal cases, in support of the latter statement.
Some of the states are
duplicated in both lists. His citations are suspect also because he cites
Clay v. State as holding that the admissibility of a confession is a question
solely for the judge! 3 4a Wigmore does not identify the Massachusetts rule as
separate and distinct from the New York rule. Meltzer, writing in 1954,
3:
cites only Rhode Island and Colorado as supporting the Massachusetts rule,
but indicates that his citations are not intended to be exhaustive.
The Massachusetts rule would have the merit, for Wyoming, of not
constituting a radical departure from what we have done historically, and
of retaining the jury as a component part of the procedure. In People v.
Huntley,"" a case subsequent to the Jackson case, the New York Court of Appeals expressly adopted the Massachusetts rule for New York. The Huntley
opinion is a significant one since it recognizes the retroactivity of Jackson v.
Denno, discusses the applicability of various post-conviction procedures, and
lays down guidelines for trial courts. Limitations of time prevent a detailed
discussion of the Huntley case in this presentation, but the opinion should be
studied by all who are interested in this problem of procedure re the admissibility of confessions.
One other state which had followed the New York rule prior to Jackson
v. Denno has, in the light of that decision, gone over to the Massachusetts
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

3

WICMORE, EVIDENCE §861 (3d ed. 1940).
Ibid.
Ibid
Ibid.
Meltzer, supra note 21, at 323.
People v. Huntley, 16 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965).
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rule. 37 On the other hand, two former "New York rule states" have recently
selected the orthodox rule.38 At the moment of this writing, then, the score
stands at 2-2.
If Wyoming does adopt the Massachusetts rule, could we institute the
practice of submitting to the jury a special interrogatory inquiring whether
the jury accepted or whether it repudiated the trial judge's finding that the
confession was voluntary? If this were done, then one of the greatest objections to both the New York and Massachusetts rules would be removed,
namely, that we do not know, under either one, whether the jury found the
confession voluntary and considered it in arriving at a guilty verdict, or
whether it found the confession coerced and ostensibly ruled it out of consideration in arriving at the verdict. Dean Mason Ladd, a recognized authority on evidence, has observed that: "Conceivably a special interrogatory to
the jury might solve the problem of the Stein case in determining whether the
confession was voluntary. . . . This practice of using interrogatories
has not been followed."' 39 Rule 49(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes special interrogatories, and a Wyoming statute provides
that: "The proceedings provided by law in civil cases as to . . . the manner
of returning the verdict shall be had upon all trials on indictments, so far as
' 40
the proceedings may be applicable, and when it is not otherwise provided."
But at this point we encounter what seems to be an ambiguity in the
Jackson opinion.
In its dictum approval of the Massachusetts rule the
Court definitely contemplates that the same jury which passes on the issue of
voluntariness will be the jury which determines the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused. Yet in a footnote at a later stage of the opinion this
statement is made: "Whether the trial judge, another judge, or another jury,
but not the convicting jury (emphasis supplied) fully resolves the issue of
voluntariness is not a matter of concern here."41 If this language is to be
taken at face value, then the Massachusetts rule as it has heretofore existed
would have to be modified by the requirement that if juries are to be used
at all there must be two of them: one to pass upon
the issue of voluntariness,
and the other to pass upon the ultimate issue, either with or without the confession, depending upon the action of Jury No. 1; certainly a cumbersome,
expensive and time-consuming procedure. It is to be hoped that the Supreme
Court will clarify its position on this point.
Itis likely that before long the Supreme Court of Wyoming will be called
upon to solve, for our state, the orthodox-Massachusetts-New York rule dilemma. The legal profession will await the answer with great interest.
37. State v. Brewton, 238 Ore. 590, 395 P.2d 874 (1964).
38. People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d (1965); State v. Burke,-Wis..
133 N.W.2d 953 (1965).
39. LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 504 (2d ed. 1955).
40. WYo. STAT. §7-237 (1957).
41. Jackson, supra note 10, at 391 n. 19.

